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 Historically, even countries that seek only their own security have often depended on 
military threats and the ability to use force as a way to defend their interests and deter challenges. 
But a threat-based strategy will not always be effective. In some situations, promises to respect 
or ensure the security of others may be appropriate as a complement or even alternative to 
strategies that threaten others with negative consequences. Such security assurances, however, 
have received much less attention from policymakers and scholars than have measures for 
defense or deterrence. 
 In practice, the most prominent use of security assurances in international politics has 
been in conjunction with efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1968 Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly called the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), created two classes of states: nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon 
states (NNWS). Only the five states that had tested nuclear weapons before the treaty was 
opened for signature (the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France) could join as NWS, 
while all other states were expected to join as NNWS. Those countries required to forswear 
nuclear weapons have sought to make sure that doing so would not jeopardize their security vis-
à-vis NWS. They have requested both negative security assurances, which involve a pledge by 
NWS not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against NNWS, and positive security 




such a threat or attack. The NWS have offered such pledges, but not in forms as strong as most 
NNWS would like. 
 The goal of this project is to investigate the potential utility of security assurances both as 
a nonproliferation tool and more generally. In order to carry out this assessment, a group of 
subject-matter and country specialists were invited to a workshop in Colorado Springs, CO, in 
August 2009. The specialists presented their initial research findings and, based on feedback 
received, revised their papers for publication in this volume. Overall, this project has three 
objectives: 
• to define and clarify different existing concepts of assurance and how they relate to one 
another; 
• to assess the overall effectiveness of security assurances and, more importantly, to 
identify the conditions under which assurances are most likely to be effective; and 
• to ascertain how important a role security assurances play in promoting nonproliferation 
and how to make them as effective as possible in preventing nuclear proliferation. 
This introductory chapter proceeds in four sections. First, it establishes that security 
assurances have been relatively understudied as an influence strategy, and it reviews the modest 
body of relevant literature that does exist. Second, it summarizes the different ways in which 
relevant terms have been used, and it seeks to clarify and clearly define the relevant concepts. 
Third, this chapter introduces some preliminary hypotheses about the conditions under which 
security assurances are most likely to be effective. It does so by drawing on and adapting 
hypotheses from two bodies of literature: research on deterrence and reassurance, and research 
on the causes of nuclear proliferation. A fourth section briefly introduces the research design of 




Following some discussion of relevant theory and history, the majority of chapters involve 
empirical case studies of individual country’s deliberations about nuclear weapons. The focus on 
nuclear proliferation plays a dual role in this study. First, for the purpose of examining security 
assurances in general, decisions about nuclear acquisition or restraint are a useful empirical test 
bed. This is the only policy area in which security assurances have been widely used, creating a 
ready set of cases that can be selected for study. In addition, because all the cases involve the 
same type of policy decision, it is easier to compare them. Finally, because decisions about 
whether or not to obtain nuclear weapons involve the highest possible national security stakes, 
they pose a hard test for any strategy intended to dissuade states from taking certain actions. If 
security assurances have some effectiveness in preventing nuclear proliferation, they are likely to 
have utility in relation to a range of other policy goals as well. 
Second, nuclear nonproliferation is a focus in this study due to its intrinsic importance. The 
more countries that obtain nuclear weapons, the more opportunities there will be for non-state 
terrorist actors to get their hands on a nuclear device. It is also important to keep nuclear arms 
out of the hands of hostile or revisionist regimes that might use them to threaten and intimidate 
their neighbors. In addition, there is a risk that any pair of rivals that acquire nuclear weapons 
could find themselves in a crisis that escalates to a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Because of 
these dangers, a systematic effort to evaluate the potential utility of security assurances in 
promoting nonproliferation is long overdue.  
 
Assurances as an Understudied Strategy 
 This volume focuses on assurances as a tool of interstate relations, setting aside for the 




one of the few previous efforts to study security assurances, Virginia Foran defined them as “any 
type of assistance a state receives or is promised to receive from an outside source that 
contributes to its security.”1
Compared to other strategies employed in international politics, assurances have not been 
the subject of much empirical research. Overall, coercive strategies such as deterrence and 
compellence have received by far the greatest attention.
 This definition is too broad. It includes many forms of security 
assistance and cooperation, such as arms transfers, intelligence sharing, or training another 
state’s military, that might not be intended as part of a conscious effort at assurance. Assurances 
are better seen as promises; they involve declarations or signals meant to convey a commitment 
to take or refrain from taking certain actions in the future. In the simplest terms, assurances are 
attempts by one state or set of states to convince another state or set of states that the senders 
either will not cause or will not allow the recipients’ security to be harmed.  
2 This is no surprise, given the central 
role assigned to deterrence in preventing a superpower nuclear war during the Cold War. In 
addition to the manipulation of military threats for coercive purposes, the use of economic 
statecraft has been a focus of much research. This has mainly involved efforts to determine the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions and to a lesser extent the usefulness of positive incentives.3
                                                 
1 Virginia I. Foran, ed., Security Assurances: Implications for the NPT and Beyond (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1995).  
 
2 The literature dealing with deterrence and compellence is far too vast to cite even just the “greatest hits” in a 
reference note. For good overviews of the empirical research on deterrence, see Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and 
International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2 
(1999), and Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For a recent 
volume of empirical research on coercive diplomacy that also summarizes earlier research, see Robert J. Art and 
Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace, 2003). 
3 Here again the literature is too vast to cite comprehensively. Two widely cited studies of economic sanctions, 
which reach contrasting conclusions, are Gary Clyde Hufbauer , Jeffrey J. Schott , Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara 
Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2007), and Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security, Vol. 22, 
No. 2 (Fall 1997). An important study of positive incentives that explicitly focuses on nonproliferation cases is 
Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, eds., The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control (Columbia, SC: 




Some studies have also examined the potential of diplomatic strategies like engagement or 
considered how well the United States uses informational tools such as public diplomacy and 
strategic communication. In recent years, the idea of “soft power” as a possible basis of influence 
has also elicited considerable interest.4
 In contrast, there has been no attempt to develop a general theory of security assurances 
or to conduct systematic empirical research on the effectiveness of assurances. Most discussions 
of NPT-related assurances focus on policy issues. They typically either address the legal status of 
existing assurances or offer policy prescriptions for how to strengthen assurances. I am aware of 
only two prior studies that involved empirical research to estimate the effectiveness of NPT-
related assurances. The first was the project run by Virginia Foran, whose definition of 
assurances is cited above. It included two country case studies, of Ukraine and North Korea, but 
these were never published after plans to print all the papers from the project in an edited book 
volume fell through.
 
5 Sherman Garnett, the author of the Ukraine study, has updated his analysis 
for the present volume. More recently, a paper by Bruno Tertrais sought to assess the impact of 
assurances across a large number of past cases.6
                                                 
4 The term “soft power” was coined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. For a good overview, see his Soft Power: The Means to 
Success in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Perseus Books, 2004).  
 Dr. Tertrais has elaborated the portion of his 
analysis dealing with positive security assurances in a chapter contained in this volume. While 
quite valuable as a preliminary survey, because the Tertrais paper examined many cases briefly, 
it was not able to go into depth on any individual cases. In this volume, several country 
specialists have written about the individual cases they know best, as a way to add greater 
5 Some of the papers, but not the country case studies, were included in a monograph circulated in limited numbers 
by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Copies of this monograph, which includes the definition of 
assurances quoted above, are quite difficult to obtain, and as a result of its limited availability this study did not have 
much influence on the body of knowledge concerning assurances. 
6 The paper was initially drafted for a conference on “Over-the-Horizon Threats: WMD Proliferation 2020,” Paris, 
France, 28-29 June, 2007. It is scheduled to be published as “Security Assurances and the Future of Proliferation,” 





empirical depth to the assessment of assurances. In addition, the Tertrais analysis was not 
grounded in any existing body of theoretical literature. This introductory chapter attempts to 
draw hypotheses out of relevant literatures as a way of identifying mechanisms through which 
and conditions under which security assurances can be effective.  
 The most relevant body of social science literature deals with the concept of reassurance. 
For reasons that will be explained below, reassurance should be considered one form of 
assurance. But the range of possible assurance strategies is broader than just reassurance. For this 
reason, while work on reassurance is helpful for developing a framework for thinking about the 
effectiveness of assurances, it cannot by itself provide a complete framework. In addition, as will 
be discussed shortly, the body of empirical research on reassurance is also limited. In short, 
neither the specific strategy of reassurance nor the more general topic of assurances has received 
much systematic attention. As a focus for empirical research, security assurances are perhaps the 




 In academic literature and government policy documents and discussions, the terms 
assurance, assurances, and reassurance all appear. These terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably, but each has also been defined in ways that differ. Before attempting to develop 
causal hypotheses or conduct empirical research, therefore, it will be helpful to clarify the 
relevant terminology. The goal is to develop a generic, overarching concept of assurances that 





Assurance I – A Component of Deterrence: The earliest use of the term assurance appears to be 
in the work of Thomas Schelling. In his highly influential writings about coercive strategies, 
Schelling introduced the idea of assurance as a necessary element of deterrence or compellence. 
If one thinks of deterrence as a threat to impose costs on an actor if it takes an action one wishes 
to prevent, then logically the strategy entails a promise not to impose those costs as long as the 
actor refrains from taking the unwanted action.7
 
 Otherwise, the target has no incentive to refrain, 
meaning deterrence can fail when such assurance is not given or not believed, even when the 
deterrent threat itself is credible. Assurance in this first usage is not a separate strategy, but is 
instead one component of a deterrence strategy. Henceforth, it will be referred to as deterrence-
related assurance. 
Assurance II – Alliance Commitments: A more recent usage of the term assurance emerged in 
U.S. policy in the George W. Bush administration. In its initial Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) and National Security Strategy, the administration identified assuring allies and friends of 
the U.S. commitment to them as one of the goals of U.S. defense strategy.8
 This type of assurance, of the credibility of one’s alliance commitments, is analogous to 
some other well-known concepts, such as security guarantees and extended deterrence. These 
 In the first usage of 
assurance, above, it is a measure directed toward potential adversaries as part of an effort to deter 
them. As used by the Bush administration, assurance is a strategy directed at allies, not 
adversaries. It can also be considered as a stand-alone strategy, rather than being only a sub-
element of deterrence or compellence. 
                                                 
7 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 74. Schelling actually 
made this point even earlier, but without terming it “assurance.” See The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 6-7. 
8 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Sept. 30, 2001; President of the United States, 




other concepts have often been associated with the idea of extending a nuclear umbrella to 
protect friends and allies from nuclear attack, which makes them also relevant to NPT-related 
positive security assurances (discussed below). But the Bush administration strategy of assurance 
was not limited to nuclear scenarios; it also implied assurance against conventional and other 
non-nuclear threats as well as the potential use of non-nuclear means to provide such assurance. 
To distinguish it from the first type of assurance, the second form of assurance will henceforth be 
called alliance-related assurance.  
The term assurance has also been used in a third context in International Relations, in 
relation to theories of cooperation. Lisa Martin introduced the notion of an “assurance game” to 
model situations in which two parties both prefer mutual cooperation but might nevertheless fail 
to cooperate due to uncertainty about the other side.9
 
 In this game, mechanisms to provide 
greater transparency should enable cooperation to take place. The idea of increasing the 
transparency of one’s cooperative intentions fits well with the prevailing usage of the term 
reassurance. For this reason, Martin’s notion of assurance will not be considered a third meaning 
of that term but will instead be treated as belonging under the rubric of reassurance.  
Reassurance: Reassurance is a strategy of seeking to persuade another state that one harbors no 
aggressive intentions toward it. Writing in the early 1980s, Michael Howard was the first to 
propose adding the term “reassurance” to discussions of strategy, but his definition of it was a 
variant of what has here been labeled alliance-related assurance.10
                                                 
9 Lisa L. Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 4 (autumn 1992), 
pp. 780-83. 
 Writing a few years later, Ned 
10 Michael Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 
(winter 1982). Howard’s usage, reflecting European concerns about U.S. nuclear strategy at the time, was broader 
than the Bush administration notion of assurance, in that it also included assuring one’s allies that one would not 




Lebow appears to have been the first to propose the label “reassurance” in what is now the 
prevailing usage: a strategy of demonstrating non-aggressive intentions to an adversary as a way 
of compensating for some of the limitations of deterrence.11
First, in the early 1960s, Charles Osgood and Amitai Etzioni argued for the need to move 
away from hard-line approaches to deterrence, seeing these as fueling an ever-spiraling arms 
race.
 This concept of reassurance 
emerged from three related strands of literature: early 1960s work on alternatives to the arms 
race, the “third wave” in deterrence research, and work on the security dilemma.  
12
A second source of work on reassurance grew out of the third wave in deterrence 
research.
 Both authors put forward similar ideas, but perhaps because he had a good acronym for 
his proposal, Osgood’s GRIT (graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension-reduction) has 
received the most follow-up attention. Osgood was a social psychologist, and he designed GRIT 
to overcome the mistrust he saw as helping fuel the arms race. GRIT involves taking a series of 
modest unilateral cooperative initiatives. These are publicly announced in advance, and the other 
side is invited to reciprocate. If the other side seeks to exploit one’s cooperation, GRIT requires 
retaliating for this, but then resuming the effort to initiate cooperation. GRIT’s persistence is 
intended to challenge the other side’s expectations and change their presumed image of the first 
side as implacably hostile. 
13 George and Smoke’s landmark study Deterrence in American Foreign Policy 
initiated a line of case-study research that emphasized the ways in which deterrence can fail.14
                                                 
11 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Deterrrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?” and “Conclusions,” in Robert Jervis, 
Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1985). 
 
12 Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962); Amitai 
Etzioni, The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy (New York: The Crowell-Collier Press, 1962) 
13 The identification of three waves comes from Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics, Vol. 
31, No. 2 (January 1979). 
14 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New 




George and Smoke recommended that, due to the problems with relying on deterrence, U.S. 
strategy make greater use of diplomacy and positive incentives. Subsequent work in the third 
wave added reassurance to the list of alternatives. Lebow and Janice Stein have done the most to 
elaborate the theory behind reassurance and different options for pursuing it.15
The third source of thinking about reassurance emerged from work on the security 
dilemma. Robert Jervis’s influential distinction between the deterrence and spiral models and 
subsequent refinements by Charles Glaser were especially important.
 Stein has updated 
her work on the role of psychological factors in reassurance for this volume. 
16 The security dilemma 
refers to the idea that efforts by one state to increase its security, especially through an arms 
buildup, can make other states insecure, leading them to respond in ways that could lead to a 
conflict that the first state’s efforts were intended to avoid. The dilemma arises because efforts to 
avoid provoking this escalatory spiral can leave a state vulnerable and be seen as a sign of 
weakness by states that have aggressive intentions. Deterrence is the appropriate policy in the 
latter case, but is the wrong prescription and likely to be counterproductive when dealing with 
states motivated by insecurity. Implicit in this analysis is the idea that in situations that fit the 
spiral model, reassurance is the appropriate strategy.17
                                                 
15 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues 43, 4 (winter 1987); 
Janice Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, vol. 2, ed. Philip Tetlock et al. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Richard Ned Lebow, “Deterrence and Reassurance: Lessons from the 
Cold War,” Global Dialogue, Vol. 3, No. 4 (autumn 2001). 
 Although reassurance is sometimes put 
forward as an alternative to deterrence, because states can have mixed motivations, combining 
greed and insecurity, reassurance and deterrence can also be used together as complementary 
strategies. 
16 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976), chap. 3; Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy,” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 
(July 1992) 




Jervis, Glaser and others working mainly within the realist tradition, such as Jack Snyder, 
link reassurance to structural conditions. This leads them to view reassurance primarily in 
military terms and to recommend placing an emphasis on defensive rather than offensive military 
capabilities (i.e., defensive or non-offensive defense).18 Lebow and Stein, in contrast, emphasize 
the impacts of domestic politics and especially psychology and view reassurance as a way to 
overcome constraints on rationality that arise from these sources. For them, reassurance is not 
just military but includes broader political gestures and agreements.19
In a more recent effort at theory building, Andrew Kydd has sought to ground 
reassurance on a purely rational-actor foundation, using game theory to model a reassurance 
game, but without treating reassurance as purely a function of military posture. He finds 
signaling that is costly but not too costly to be the key. Reassurance will be effective when there 
is a signal that is sufficiently costly that only a security-seeking state would be willing to attempt 
it while an expansionist state would not, but the signal must not be so costly that it leaves the 
sender vulnerable to attack if the recipient is actually motivated by greed rather than insecurity.
  
20
The effectiveness of reassurance in real-world applications in international relations has 
not been a subject of nearly as much empirical research as has deterrence, but there are some 




                                                 
18 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics , Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978); Jack L. 
Snyder, “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914,” in Jervis et al., Psychology and Deterrence; Glaser, 
“Political Consequences of Military Strategy.” 
 while several studies have debated whether the use of a GRIT-like strategy by 
19 Lebow, “Conclusions,” p. 227. 
20 Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
21 Deborah Welch Larson, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty,” International Organization, Vol. 41, 




Gorbachev proved effective.22 Janice Stein has elucidated the use of reassurance more broadly 
by both Sadat (especially his visit to Jerusalem) and Gorbachev, and Kydd also uses Gorbachev 
as a case study of reassurance.23 More recently, Evan Braden Montgomery has critiqued 
reassurance, finding it failed in two out of three case studies he examined. Montgomery explains 
this in structural terms, arguing that it is rare to find the kind of offense-defense differentiation 
that would make non-offensive defense a viable means of reassurance.24 By focusing only on the 
offense-defense balance, however, Montgomery overlooks the psychological approach that 
views reassurance as a way to overcome an adversary’s cognitive barriers to changing its image 
of the sender. Finally, there are several recent studies by graduate students that could later end up 
adding to the body of published empirical research on reassurance.25
Reassurance is clearly a form of assurance, in that it seeks to assure the other side that 
one is not out to harm them. But it differs from the two forms of assurance described above. 
Reassurance can be a completely alternative strategy to deterrence, so it should be distinguished 
from the use of assurance as an implied element within a deterrence strategy. Reassurance is also 
a negative form of assurance – a promise by state A not to attack state B – so it should be 
distinguished from the positive form of assurance implied by a commitment to come to the 
defense of one’s allies if they are attacked. In this sense, reassurance is narrower than the 
category of security assurances as a whole, meaning that research on reassurance cannot by itself 
 
                                                 
22 Richard A. Bitzinger, “Gorbachev and GRIT, 1985-1989: Did Arms Control Succeed Because of Unilateral 
Actions or in Spite of Them?” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 15, No. 1 (April 1994); Alan R. Collins, “GRIT, 
Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (April 1998). 
23 Janice Gross Stein, “Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict,” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges 
of Managing International Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall 
(Washington, DC: USIP Press. 2001); Kydd, Trust and Mistrust, chap. 8. 
24 Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma,” International Security 31, 2 (fall 2006) 
25 Jungsoo Kim, “Reassurance Strategy: Incentives for Use and Conditions for Success,” Ph.D. diss., Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2010; Dave A. Lopez, “Coaxing the Peace: Reassurance Strategy in the 
Twenty-First Century,” M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2010; Michael A. Glosny, 
“The Grand Strategies of Rising Powers: Reassurance, Coercion, and Balancing Responses,” Ph.D. diss., MIT, 




supply a complete theory of assurance strategies. But in another sense reassurance is broader 
than NPT-related security assurances, because it applies to the conventional realm as well as the 
nuclear realm and even potentially to non-military issues.26





the usage developed by Lebow and Stein has become the more prevalent. It makes sense to 
standardize terminology based on the most common and prominent usages. Hence, reassurance 
should be defined as efforts to demonstrate an absence of aggressive intentions, while assurance 
is used to refer to efforts to bolster the confidence of one’s allies (or to a sub-component of a 
deterrence strategy). 
Security Assurances: The most common use of the term assurances (plural rather than singular) 
comes from the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Countries that give up nuclear weapons 
naturally want guarantees that they will not be risking their security as a result. Such guarantees 
will be labeled NPT-related assurances. The history of NPT-related security assurances is 
covered in the chapter by John Simpson, so this chapter will not go into detail on that history. 
Empirical research on the effectiveness on NPT-related assurances is made complicated, 
however, by the fact that the status of these assurances is itself somewhat ambiguous. 
 NNWS have requested two types of assurance. Positive security assurances are promises 
by NWS to come to the aid of NNWS if they are threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons.28
                                                 
26 For an argument that reassurance can be achieved by addressing the other side’s concerns about non-traditional 
security threats, see Lopez, “Coaxing the Peace.” 
 
Negative security assurances are promises not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons 
27 For example, Ariel Ilan Roth, “Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel,” International Studies 
Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 4 (November 2009). 
28 If positive security assurances include more than just extended nuclear deterrence, then non-nuclear states could 




against NNWS. The NWS would not agree to include security assurances in the text of the NPT, 
so existing security assurances have all arisen from commitments made outside the treaty itself. 
In practice, these assurances have often involved qualifications or caveats, so that they have not 
been considered satisfactory by all NNWS. As a result, there have been periodic efforts by some 
NNWS to have security assurances made universally applicable and legally binding. 
 U.S. policy after the end of the Cold War, and particularly following 9/11, has been a 
special source of consternation. Concerns about the spread of chemical and biological weapons 
(CBW) and the rise of transnational terrorism led to U.S. hints that nuclear weapons might be 
used against CBW or even non-WMD targets and, in the Bush years, to suggestions that they 
might be used preemptively. These appear to be contrary to earlier negative security assurances, 
in that the targets might be non-nuclear states. As a result, much of the writing about security 
assurances in the last 10-15 years has been prescriptive, urging the NWS to re-affirm and 
strengthen NPT-related assurances.29
 Empirical research on the effectiveness of NPT assurances is more limited. As noted 
above, only Tertrais has attempted an overall survey of effectiveness. A project run by Foran 
examined two cases, but the planned volume that would have included these case studies was 
never published. More recently, a critique of NPT-related assurances by Joseph Pilat asserted 
there is little evidence that such assurances have had much impact, but the article was not based 
on any new empirical research.
 
30
                                                 
29 See, for example, George Bunn and Jean du Preez, “More than Words: The Value of U.S. Non-Nuclear-Use 
Promises,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 37, No. 6 (July/August 2007). Add others if not included in Simpson?? 
 Empirical studies of the causes of proliferation and of nuclear 
restraint or renunciation have sometimes touched on the role of security assurances, though none 
have made this a central object of the study.  





Within the proliferation literature, some pertinent evidence can be found in a growing 
body of statistical work that has emerged since 2004. These studies, which attempt to use 
quantitative techniques to assess suspected causes of proliferation, all include defense pacts with 
NWS as one of their variables. Such alliances with nuclear-armed states can be considered a 
form of positive security assurance, though one that results from a bilateral relationship rather 
than a universal commitment. Unfortunately, the results are inconsistent and far from definitive. 
Multivariate analyses by Singh and Way, Jo and Gartzke, Kroenig, and Bleek all find that a 
defense pact with a nuclear ally reduces the likelihood of nuclear proliferation, but the finding is 
not uniformly strong.31 All of these studies include alternative ways of estimating their model of 
proliferation, and in each study the variable for having a nuclear ally falls below standard levels 
of statistical significance in at least some of the estimations. Support for this slightly positive 
correlation between security guarantees and nonproliferation is also not uniform across studies. 
A re-estimation of the Singh and Way model by Montgomery and Sagan that rectifies a 
purported methodological problem finds alliances with a nuclear-armed state are no longer 
statistically significant.32
                                                 
31 Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
48, 6 (Dec. 2004); Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 51, 1 (Feb. 2007); Matthew Kroenig, “Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and 
Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, 2 (April 2009); Philipp C. Bleek, “Why Do States 
Proliferate? Quantitative Analysis of the Exploration, Pursuit, and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons,” in William 
Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, forthcoming). In a slightly different analysis, Way and Sasikumar found that a defense pact with a 
nuclear state had a statistically significant positive correlation with a state’s likelihood of joining the NPT. 
Christopher Way and Karthika Sasikumar, “Leaders and Laggards: When and Why Do Countries Sign the NPT?” 
Working Paper 16, Research Group in International Security (REGIS), McGill University and Universite de 
Montreal, 2004. 
 And two recent analyses, by Fuhrmann and by Mueller and Schmidt, 
32 Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict 




actually find that defense pacts with NWS are associated with an increased risk of proliferation, 
though again this correlation is not statistically significant.33
The statistical studies do not attempt to measure the impact of negative security 
assurances, nor do they consider other possible types of positive assurance beyond a defense 
treaty. The fact that some studies find a modest but not necessarily significant impact for positive 
assurances, while others do not, might be due to variations across individual cases in the 
importance of such assurances. If so, case study research might help tease out the factors that 
make positive assurances more or less important. 
  
Compared to the quantitative research, the case study literature on nuclear proliferation 
and restraint has tended to reach more skeptical conclusions about the impact of security 
guarantees. Much of the recent research has been concerned with challenging traditional realist-
oriented security explanations for proliferation. Within a security model of proliferation, the 
availability of a security guarantee from a nuclear ally would be one explanation for why a state 
facing security threats nevertheless eschews nuclear weapons. Several studies note, however, that 
realist theory itself, given its emphasis on self-help, would not lead to great confidence in the 
power of security guarantees.34
                                                 
33 Matthew Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” 
International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 (summer 2009); Harald Mueller and Andreas Schmidt, “The Little Known 
Story of De-Proliferation: Why States Give Up Nuclear Weapon Activities,” in Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 
Forecasting Proliferation. 
 Doubts about the credibility of extended deterrence during the 
Cold War are a vivid illustration of why states might not want to entrust their security to an ally 
that might be making itself vulnerable to nuclear retaliation if it acts. Etel Solingen points out 
that the overall record does not suggest a strong correlation. Some states with nuclear allies 
nevertheless pursued nuclear weapons (Britain, France, North Korea before the fall of the Soviet 
34 For example, Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field,” Nonproliferation 




Union), while other states with no nuclear protectors have changed course (Argentina, Brazil, 
South Africa, Egypt, Libya).35 T.V. Paul, while more sympathetic to security explanations, also 
acknowledges that the impact of alliance ties varies across cases,36 and Jacques Hymans likewise 
sees no consistent correlation between alliances and proliferation decisions.37
None of these studies dismiss security guarantees entirely however. Rather, in suggesting 
that positive security assurances are not always decisive, these studies indicate the need for a 
differentiated analysis. It is possible that assurances are important to some countries in some 
circumstances, but less influential in other cases. If so, it will be necessary to develop contingent 
generalizations, and comparative analysis across cases can help identify the conditions under 
which security assurances are most likely to be effective. In addition, like the statistical 
literature, case studies of proliferation decisions have focused on positive assurances in the form 





literature on proliferation will be a useful source of hypotheses about assurances, but in its 
current state it is far from offering an adequate understanding of the effects of assurance 
strategies. 
                                                 
35 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), pp. 12-14, 25-27, 256. 
36 T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2000), pp. 153-54. 
37 Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), pp. 42-3, n. 79. 
38 A partial exception is Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The Force-
Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (winter 
2005/06). In a study of the role of coercive diplomacy in convincing Libya to give up its WMD ambitions, they 
found that the success of the strategy required offering reassurances to Qaddafi that the United States would not seek 
to impose regime change if he gave up the pursuit of WMD. Their primary focus was coercive diplomacy, however, 





Moving Toward Generalizations: NNWS have sought both positive and negative security 
assurances, but – as some of the hypotheses developed below will suggest – individual countries 
may vary in which type of assurance they deem most important. From the perspective of NWS 
policy, unfortunately, there can be tension between the steps needed to offer positive and 
negative assurances.39
 This raises an important question: can such trade-offs be avoided or at least minimized? 
This might be possible if positive assurances did not require extending a nuclear security 
guarantee. It is worth exploring whether some combination of conventional military responses, 
provision of missile defenses, and pledges of non-military assistance would make for an effective 
positive assurance. The chapter by Bruno Tertrais provides some initial thoughts on this issue. 
 Positive assurances have been most associated with the idea of a nuclear 
umbrella. The ability to extend nuclear deterrence over friends and allies implies a need to 
maintain an adequate-sized nuclear arsenal and a posture of readiness to use those weapons. But 
this same posture can be seen as contrary to the spirit of negative assurances. Promises not to 
threaten or use nuclear weapons become more convincing if NWS reduce the numbers of nuclear 
weapons they possess and the missions and roles assigned to those weapons. Arguments that 
positive security guarantees require maintaining robust nuclear capabilities could make negative 
assurances appear insincere. 
 The form in which assurances are delivered might also make a difference. Existing 
research has mostly focused on bilateral assurances. A defense pact between a nuclear and a non-
nuclear state has been taken to imply a positive security guarantee. This is not the only form in 
which assurances might be offered however; beyond bilateral assurances, three other basic 
formats are possible. If a bilateral pledge involves a one-to-one arrangement, then other 
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alternatives include one-to-all, all-to-one, and all-to-all arrangements (either globally or within a 
region). A single state might offer a generalized assurance that applies to all other states. The 
negative assurances provided by the NWS have basically taken this form, with some caveats. 
There can also be circumstances in which all the NWS, or some other multilateral coalition or 
even the international community as whole, make a pledge directed at one individual state. The 
various pledges made to Ukraine after the breakup of the Soviet Union are a possible example of 
a “many-to-one” assurance. Finally, there could be assurances that are generalized in terms of 
both senders and recipients. For example, a UN resolution that required all states, nuclear and 
non-nuclear, to offer economic, medical, and other assistance to any state that is the victim of a 
nuclear attack would be a globalized form of positive assurance.40 These four possible formats 
for assurances will be referred to as bilateral, generalized individual, focused multilateral, and 
global (or universal) assurances. It might also be worth considering regional arrangements to be 
a fifth format, as some existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) have incorporated 
negative assurances from the NWS.41
 This chapter starts from the premise that security assurances can be thought of in a 
generic fashion as any attempt by a state or group of states to convince another state or group of 
 This raises the obvious question of whether the format in 
which an assurance is provided affects its impact. For example, if North Korea can be 
influenced, is it more likely to respond to a focused multilateral assurance provided through the 
mechanism of six-party talks or is it only going to be satisfied by a bilateral deal directly with the 
United States? 
                                                 
40 For an argument in favor of the need to move toward such universalized security assurances, see Rebecca 
Johnson, “Security Assurances for Everyone: A New Approach to Deterring the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” 
Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 90 (spring 2009). Harald Mueller earlier pointed out that positive security assurances 
need not be limited to the NWS but could include pledges from NNWS (“Between Security Council Inaction and 
Self-Helplessness: The Case for a Positive Security Assurances Alliance,” in Foran, Security Assurances). 
41 Leonard S. Spector and Aubrie Ohlde, “Negative Security Assurances: Revisiting the Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone 




states that their security will not be harmed. NPT-related assurances are one form of assurance 
(or perhaps more accurately one context in which assurances have been employed), but other 
forms and policy goals for assurances are possible. However, the NPT-related distinction 
between positive and negative assurances can easily be generalized. Alliance-related assurance, 
as described in the Bush administration QDR, is a type of positive assurance. Positive assurances 
involve pledges to come to the assistance of the recipient if some third party threatens or attacks 
it. The strategy of reassurance is a type of negative assurance. Negative assurances involve 
pledges by the sender not to itself threaten or attack the recipient. It is important to learn more 
about the potential effectiveness of both positive and negative security assurances, both as 
nonproliferation tools and as more general instruments of statecraft. 
 
Preliminary Hypotheses 
 A major goal of this project is to develop contingent generalizations about the 
circumstances under which security assurances are more or less likely to be effective. Because 
there has not previously been much effort to develop an empirical theory of assurances, the 
development of generalizations will arise in part from inductive methods. Participants in this 
project have examined several individual cases, with the idea that by comparing the lessons of 
those cases some generalizations would emerge. To assist in the investigation of the cases, 
however, some preliminary hypotheses to be considered by the case study authors were made 
available beforehand. This section describes these initial hypotheses, which were derived from 
other bodies of theory relevant to thinking about security assurances. The two most relevant 
literatures are those on deterrence (and to a lesser extent coercive diplomacy and reassurance) 




from both literatures and is presented first, then additional hypotheses are derived separately 
from discussions of deterrence and proliferation, respectively. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Assurances are more likely to be effective when a target state’s interest in nuclear 
weapons is driven to a significant degree by security concerns. 
 
 This hypothesis is basically common sense. Efforts to assure a state about its security will 
be most relevant when a state is in fact concerned about security. This hypothesis also follows 
from the primary condition that affects whether reassurance or deterrence is the most appropriate 
strategy. Reassurance strategies, and by implication assurances in general, are most likely to be 
effective when dealing with an insecure state. With respect to a state with offensive motivations, 
assurances may be beside the point or even dangerous. The proliferation literature also suggests 
this is a meaningful hypothesis. Traditionally, security concerns have been the primary 
explanation given for decisions to develop nuclear weapons. Increasingly, however, this 
literature has identified other explanations for some decisions about nuclear programs, ranging 
from concerns about prestige to a variety of internally-driven factors. Hypotheses suggested by 
these alternative explanations will be discussed below. The point here is that if a particular 
proliferation decision is not motivated at least partly by security concerns, then assurances are 
less likely to be effective. They may not be guaranteed to fail, as other hypotheses introduced 
below suggest circumstances under which assurances might have influence even when a state’s 
leaders are not driven by security concerns, but other things being equal they are less likely to 
succeed. It is also possible that the relationship might be one that would be graphed as an 




insecurity, but for states that perceive extreme levels of danger there may be no outside security 
guarantee strong enough to dissuade them from seeking their own nuclear deterrent. 
 
Hypotheses from Deterrence Theory 
 
 Factors that make deterrence work or fail have been extensively studied. Because 
deterrence and assurance are both influence strategies, some findings about deterrence might, 
with appropriate adaptation, also apply to assurances. There is not a unified theory of deterrence, 
but rather three partly overlapping, partly competitive schools of thought. Rational deterrence 
theory (RDT), derived from neo-realist theories of international relations, is the mainstream 
approach. Proponents of a strategic culture approach have rejected the assumption of a generic or 
universal rational actor, leading them to recommend a strategy that in recent U.S. policy has been 
labeled “tailored deterrence.” Finally, a decision-making approach, characteristic of much of the 
third wave in deterrence theory, stresses domestic, organizational, and psychological constraints 
on rationality. This chapter does not take a position on which approach is right, but rather mines 
all three for potentially applicable hypotheses. 
 The primary emphasis in RDT is on credibility. Credibility is taken to be a function of 
four factors: formulating a commitment, communicating the commitment, having the capability 
to back it up, and demonstrating the intent to back it up.42
                                                 
42 William W. Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence,” in Military Policy and National Security, ed. William 
W. Kaufmann  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: 
The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 84-5. 
 The first step, formulating a 
commitment, will be taken for granted here, as the NWS have said they accept the need to offer 
certain security assurances, but the other three factors suggest possible hypotheses. Two 





Hypothesis 2: Public declarations of security assurances increase their effectiveness. 
 
It is possible to communicate assurances through unpublicized diplomatic channels, but 
announcing assurances publicly might make them more credible. A public declaration commits a 
state in the eyes of other states and its own public. Failure to follow through could damage the 
state’s reputation and its government’s standing with domestic constituencies. The audience 
costs associated with public declarations have been found to make deterrent threats more 
effective,43
 
 and the same may be true with respect to assurances. With respect to negative 
assurances, this hypothesis suggests that public declarations the NWS made in 1978 might have 
made these assurances more effective than they were previously. 
Hypothesis 3: Legally binding mechanisms will increase the effectiveness of assurances. 
 
This hypothesis is not derived directly from the deterrence literature, but is suggested by the 
history of policy debates about NPT-related security assurances. NNWS have often sought 
legally binding assurances, which suggests they would find such assurances more credible. Neo-
liberal institutionalism, which identifies several mechanisms through which international 
institutions can make future cooperation more likely, provides possible theoretical underpinnings 
for this hypothesis.44
                                                 
43 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994). 
 There are two types of legally binding commitments that could be explored. 
First, as suggested by existing research on proliferation, a formal defense treaty might make 
44 The classic work remains Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 




bilateral positive assurances more effective relative to a mere verbal declaration. Second, an 
international treaty or the equivalent binding the NWS collectively to either negative or positive 
assurances might also be more effective than purely verbal declarations. Because no such global 
treaty exists, this hypothesis might be a possible explanation if negative assurances are found to 
be of limited effectiveness. As noted above, there are some regional nuclear-weapon-free zone 
treaties in which the NWS have formally obligated themselves to negative assurances. This 
suggests it would be worthwhile to explore whether states in regions covered by these NWFZs 
have been more likely than other states to abjure nuclear weapons. 
 
 Most discussion of credibility has focused on the final two conditions: having adequate 
capabilities and the will to use them. As with formulating a commitment, the existence of 
relevant capabilities will be taken for granted here. The NWS have nuclear weapons and long-
range delivery systems, so they have the ability to extend a nuclear umbrella over other parties if 
they choose to, and they also have the ability to refrain from using or threatening the use of 
nuclear weapons. Capabilities might prove relevant, however, if they affect the other side’s 
perception of a state’s willingness to use them. Some hypotheses involving capabilities will be 
introduced, therefore, in connection with hypotheses involving the intent to follow through on 
assurance commitments. 
 Just as resolve is often seen as the key ingredient in deterrence, this might also be the 
case with respect to assurances. In RDT, estimates of resolve have been connected to three 
factors: intrinsic interests at stake, a state’s reputation based on past behavior, and the use of 




wheel out the window in a game of chicken).45
 
 All three factors suggest possible hypotheses 
relevant to assurances. 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the political and economic ties between sender and recipient, the 
more effective security assurances will be. 
 
Statistical studies of extended deterrence have found that political and economic connections 
between a deterrer and its protégé are a good indicator of the interests at stake for the deterring 
state. The greater these ties, the more likely extended deterrence is to succeed.46
 
 Because 
extended deterrence is a major element of positive assurances, the same finding is likely to apply 
to security assurances. This provides another reason why a bilateral defense pact might be 
helpful for making positive assurances effective. Importantly, this hypothesis does not rest on the 
threat of nuclear retaliation per se, but rather on the fact the client is so important to the defender 
that the latter is likely to come to the client’s aid, whether this be through nuclear or conventional 
means. 
Hypothesis 5: A reputation for keeping past nonproliferation or alliance commitments will 
increase the effectiveness of assurances. 
 
                                                 
45 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007; originally published 
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The importance of a reputation for resolve based on past behavior has been an issue of 
considerable debate in deterrence research.47 To the extent such a reputation matters, it suggests 
that a record of making good on alliance commitments will increase the credibility of positive 
security assurances. A different kind of reputation, for honesty in one’s diplomatic dealings, has 
been found to be important by Anne Sartori.48
 
 This suggests keeping one’s promises to cooperate 
is at least as important as following through on one’s threats to punish those who challenge 
deterrent commitments. If this is true, then the NWS’s record of compliance with other 
nonproliferation obligations is likely to affect the credibility of negative security assurances. For 
example, to the extent that NWS are seen as not fulfilling their NPT Article VI pledge to pursue 
nuclear disarmament, this might reduce the extent to which their negative security assurances are 
believed. 
 Capabilities and resolve come together in the realm of commitment tactics. In the Cold 
War, once the Soviet Union achieved the ability to strike the U.S. homeland, this led some to 
question the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. As de Gaulle famously asked, would the 
United States trade Chicago for Paris? Measures that have been taken previously to make 
extended deterrence commitments more credible might also be relevant to positive security 
assurances. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Forward-deployed troops and other forms of defense cooperation will increase the 
effectiveness of security assurances. 
 
                                                 
47 For a recent challenge to the importance of a state’s past behavior for how other states perceive the credibility of 
its threats, see Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). 




Forward-deployed troops were the primary commitment tactic employed by the United States 
during the Cold War. U.S. troops stationed in West Germany and South Korea were intended to 
function as a trip-wire that, by requiring an invading army to engage U.S. personnel, would place 
great pressure on the United States to respond. If the recipient of positive security assurances is 
willing to accept a nuclear state’s troops on its soil, such forward deployments might serve as a 
signal that makes such assurances more credible. More generally, other forms of defense 
cooperation, such as joint planning, joint training, or arms sales, might also increase the 
credibility of assurances by making commitments more tangible. George Bunn has argued that, 
rather than the legal language of the North Atlantic Treaty, it was these tangible security 
relationships that convinced NATO members Germany and Italy to sign the NPT as non-nuclear 
states.49
 The most contentious policy question raised by this hypothesis is whether forward-
deployed nuclear weapons are necessary to make positive assurances credible. Logically, nuclear 
weapons stationed in the United States or another NWS should be usable for extending 
deterrence to allies, because a retaliatory strike could be launched from a nuclear state’s soil or 
submarines at sea as easily as from allied territory. Perceptions are what matter here however, 
and if states believe nuclear weapons on their soil or deployed nearby are necessary then positive 
assurances will not be as effective in the absence of such deployments.  
 
 
 A second tradition of thinking about deterrence is critical of the generic rational-actor 
model used in RDT. It argues that countries with different histories, political systems, and 
strategic cultures will have different value systems, meaning that a threat that would deter the 
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United States might not deter other countries that prioritize different values. To make deterrence 
effective, this tradition holds, it is important to ascertain and hold at risk what the other side’s 
leaders value most. This suggests an analogous hypothesis regarding assurances. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Assurances will be most effective if they are tailored to take account of unique 
features of the target state’s culture, decision-making procedures, and leadership concerns. 
 
In short, just as deterrence can be tailored to individual cases, so too can assurances. As Robert 
Einhorn argues, although general theories have value, proliferation takes place “in specific – in 
specific countries, in specific international and domestic circumstances, and with specific 
persons and organizations making discrete decisions.” Hence, policies to prevent nuclear 
weapons development must “focus on individual countries.”50
A variant of this hypothesis is also suggested by some research on the causes of 
proliferation. Jacques Hymans contends that decisions to seek the bomb are ultimately made by 
state leaders, and leaders’ choices depend on their belief systems, especially their conception of 
national identity.
 This hypothesis implies that 
bilateral and focused multilateral assurances are more likely to be effective than generalized and 
global assurances.  
51
                                                 
50 Robert J. Einhorn, “Identifying Nuclear Aspirants and Their Pathways to the Bomb,” Nonproliferation Review, 
Vol. 13, No. 3 (November 2006), p. 493, emphasis in original. 
 The case studies in this volume do not seek to test hypotheses using Hymans’ 
typology of national identities. His more general theoretical approach, however, provides 
additional support for expecting assurances to be more effective if they take into account the 
target state leader’s beliefs, images, and fears. This observation is also consistent with a 
decision-making approach to deterrence theory. A decision-making approach, which emphasizes 




domestic, organizational, and psychological constraints on rationality, suggests a couple further 
hypotheses as well. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Assurances will have to be strong enough to overcome cognitive biases in order to 
be effective. Embedding them in a larger strategy may be one way to do this. 
 
This is the main hypothesis suggested by decision-making research on deterrence and 
reassurance. Research in psychology shows that once individuals form an image of another actor, 
they tend to look for confirming information and discount potentially disconfirming evidence.52 
It is thus hard – but not impossible – to change an established image. To do so requires going 
above and beyond what a rational-actor analysis would imply is necessary. Repeated actions, or 
actions so large and surprising they cannot be ignored, may be needed to overcome cognitive 
biases.53
 
 One way to do this may be to supplement negative NPT assurances with a broader 
strategy of reassurance, or to combine positive NPT assurances with a broader alliance-related 
assurance strategy. Taking additional steps that fall outside the realm of nuclear policy may be a 
way to challenge a target’s skepticism about purely nuclear-related assurances. 
Hypothesis 9: Assurances can fail if domestic or alliance constraints limit the ability of a sender 
or senders to fully implement an assurance strategy. 
 
Most of the hypotheses presented here concern factors that might affect a target state’s response 
to assurances. However, the ability of the sender(s) to follow through on an intent to offer 
                                                 
52 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, chap. 4. 




assurances can also affect the likelihood of success. Domestic opposition can undercut a 
deterrence strategy, but such constraints may be even more likely when states try a “softer” 
alternative to deterrence in dealings with adversaries. Hard-liners in the state are likely to object, 
while the public may not be convinced that it makes sense to start treating a perceived enemy 
more favorably. Research has shown that domestic constraints can undercut the use of positive 
incentives, and Lebow has suggested that a leader’s ability to overcome domestic constraints is 
likely to be important in efforts to use reassurance as well.54 A recent dissertation by Jungsoo 
Kim has shown that objections by allies can similarly prevent states from fully implementing a 
reassurance strategy.55
 
 This all suggests a need to pay attention to possible domestic and alliance 
constraints on the senders of assurances. 
Hypotheses from Proliferation Theory 
 
 To ascertain the effectiveness of security assurances as a nonproliferation tool, it is 
important to think about how assurances relate to the general factors that lead states to seek or 
renounce nuclear weapons. For this reason, research on the causes of proliferation and restraint 
represents the most directly relevant literature for identifying possible hypotheses about 
assurance.  
Security threats have long served as the standard explanation for proliferation. Observers 
expect states facing an existential threat, arising either from a nuclear-armed state or from 
adversaries with significant conventional superiority, will do whatever they have to to acquire 
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nuclear weapons, while other states will not. This perspective is reflected in the hypotheses 
introduced above. To the extent proliferation is driven at least partly by security concerns, 
assurances become relevant. But given the reasons why states may not want to count on others 
for their security, additional factors may be important determining whether or not a given 
security guarantee is deemed credible. 
If non-security considerations are at work, using assurances becomes more difficult, but 
not necessarily impossible. The worst case would be a state that has purely offensive motivations 
for seeking nuclear weapons. Interestingly, the proliferation literature has largely ignored this as 
a possible explanation, and in practice this motivation for a bomb program appears to be very 
rare. Perhaps only Iraq under Saddam Hussein had primarily expansionist reasons for seeking 
nuclear weapons. An Iraqi nuclear arsenal might have appeared promising as a shield to deter 
outside powers, so that Saddam could pursue aggression against regional neighbors, as he did in 
the invasion of Kuwait. Other rogue regimes, such as Iran or North Korea, might plausibly have 
mixed motivations, but one can make a strong case that these states have good reasons to want 
nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If so, security assurances become potentially more relevant.  
A lot of recent proliferation literature has questioned the adequacy of the security 
explanation and called attention to other potentially relevant variables. From fairly early in the 
nuclear age, it was recognized that prestige and the desire for great power status could be an 
important factor for some states. More recently, some theorists drawing on social constructivism 
have argued that the norms associated with nuclear weapons can be changed. If the 




becomes a symbol of rogue or outlaw status, not of prestige, and states concerned about their 
standing in the international community will reject nuclear programs.56
Other theorists have turned to internal factors. Nuclear weapons programs may serve the 
parochial interests of some politicians, military actors, or nuclear scientists. If these actors 
become a sufficiently powerful domestic lobby for the bomb, developments in a state’s external 
environment may become less relevant to its decisions about nuclear acquisition. Etel Solingen 
has advanced a more general coalitional theory of proliferation, based on how a state’s ruling 
coalition relates to the international economy.
  
57 Outward-looking, liberalizing coalitions seek to 
participate in the globalization process. They will renounce nuclear weapons, fearing that a bomb 
program will lead their state to be cut off from access to technology, foreign investment, trade 
opportunities, and membership in international organizations. In contrast, inward-looking 
coalitions, especially if motivated by nationalism or religious fundamentalism, will be interested 
in nuclear weapons as a symbol of defiance and national pride. Jacques Hymans has put forward 
another theory that makes similar predictions, but based at the individual rather than domestic 
level of analysis.58
 
 Hymans focuses on the state leader’s conception of national identity. Leaders 
with what he calls an “oppositional nationalist” image are the ones who will push for nuclear 
weapons. Such leaders are both highly nationalistic and see their state as having confrontational 
relations with the outside world. Leaders who lack this combination of pride and fear, in contrast, 
will not be interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. Taken as a whole, the literature on 
proliferation suggests several additional hypotheses beyond those presented above. 
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Hypothesis 10: States with regional security concerns will be most interested in positive security 
assurances; states without such concerns will be most interested in negative assurances. 
 
T.V. Paul has sought to integrate realist and liberal theories of proliferation. On the realist side, 
he confirms that security is still a good explanation for many cases, but concludes the focus has 
to be on the regional environment.59
 The logical flip side of this analysis is that negative assurances will be more relevant in 
other cases. This includes countries that do in fact view an NPT nuclear weapon state as a direct 
threat. But it also includes countries that are not directly threatened. States that want to remain 
non-aligned and states that hope to keep their region nuclear free will be most concerned about 
NWS behavior that could destabilize the situation in their region. Efforts by NWS to use nuclear 
threats against another state in the region or to deploy nuclear weapons elsewhere in the region 
might create pressures for proliferation in the region or force non-aligned states to choose a side. 
Such states will press for negative security assurances as a way to reduce the chances of such a 
scenario developing. Combining this observation with hypothesis 3 above suggests that regional 
nuclear-weapon-free zones may be an especially valuable tool for making negative security 
assurances effective. 
 Most cases of proliferation, he believes, have derived from 
regional threats, not from concerns about the two Cold War nuclear superpowers. If this is true, 
countries in dangerous regional neighborhoods represent the cases in which positive assurances 
are most likely to be effective. This suggests the role of positive assurances will merit special 
scrutiny in regions like Northeast Asia and the Middle East. 
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Hypothesis 11: The impact of assurances will depend in part on how they affect the perceived 
prestige and appropriateness of nuclear status. To the extent that norms matter, negative 
assurances are likely to be especially important. 
 
States sometimes imitate other states. In order to demonstrate their status, they will try to follow 
what is considered normal behavior for the type of state they want to be; if nuclear weapon 
possession connotes great power status, aspiring great powers will seek nuclear weapons. If 
states care about maintaining good standing in the international community, then they also want 
to act in ways that are considered legitimate. Anything that increases the prestige or status 
associated with nuclear weapons, or that makes such weapons appear a normal and appropriate 
means of pursuing national security goals, will make proliferation more attractive. Anything that 
lowers the prestige, perceived utility, or legitimacy of nuclear weapons reinforces 
nonproliferation norms. Positive security assurances, because they imply nuclear weapons have 
continued value, tend not to bolster norms against nuclear weapons acquisition (though they 
might not weaken them). Negative assurances, because they imply nuclear weapons should play 
a strictly limited role, are more easily compatible with efforts to delegitimize nuclear weapons. 
To the extent state decisions are influenced by prevailing norms, negative assurances are likely 
to be more effective than positive assurances in strengthening nonproliferation norms and 
encouraging restraint. 
 
Hypothesis 12: Assurances will be more effective if they can be utilized in a way that alters 





This hypothesis is implied by the work that highlights domestic determinants of some 
proliferation decisions. At first glance, this theory of proliferation leads to pessimistic inferences 
about assurances. If nuclear programs are driven by internal factors, then the actions of external 
actors may make no difference to calculations about whether or not to continue those programs. 
But work by Jack Snyder suggests that international influence depends on whether or not a 
particular domestic faction has fully established its control over policy.60
Combining Snyder’s approach with insights from the literatures on bureaucratic politics
 If there is still debate 
inside the ruling coalition, or if the ruling regime has not institutionalized its power fully enough 
to preclude domestic opposition, then external developments still have the potential to alter the 
course of internal debates.  
61 
and two-level games62
Negative security assurances are most directly relevant here. A well-timed statement of 
negative assurances can be used to bolster the position of moderates. Even if the underlying 
reasons why a country is pursuing nuclear weapons are found in the parochial interests or belief 
systems of certain domestic actors, the advocates of nuclear weapons development are likely to 
 yields some simple rules of thumb for influencing internal politics in 
another country. The influence strategy should aim to strengthen or at least not undermine the 
position of moderates, which in this case means those who favor participation in the 
nonproliferation regime and oppose indigenous nuclear weapons development. At the same time, 
the strategy should aim to weaken or at least not bolster the position of hard-liners, which in this 
case means advocates of a nuclear weapons program. Security assurances might be crafted to do 
this, in two ways. 
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justify the program in domestic debates by arguing that it is needed for security against external 
threats – Peter Lavoy has described this as a process of using “nuclear myths” to pave the way 
for proliferation.63
Positive assurances offer a second possible mechanism for influencing internal debates. 
In this case, the best use of positive assurances is indirect. An offer of positive security 
guarantees by a country that is being depicted as the threat is unlikely to make much difference 
in internal debates in the target state. If one’s state is viewed as the enemy, an offer to help a 
state if it is attacked by some other party is largely beside the point. But positive assurances 
might make a difference if they can be used in way that undermines the arguments of hard-liners 
that nuclear weapons development will improve the state’s security. It might be possible to do 
this indirectly, by offering positive security assurances to the state’s regional rivals, or by re-
committing to and strengthening such assurances if they already exist. If moderates can claim 
that their country’s nuclear program has led to a deepening of ties and military cooperation 
among the state’s potential adversaries, this might provide them with ammunition in domestic 
debates to argue against hard-liners’ claims that nuclear weapons are good for security.  
 A forceful, public commitment to negative security assurances by the state or 
states being portrayed as the source of a security threat can undermine the main rationale for a 
nuclear program being offered by its advocates. By refuting the rhetoric of hard-liners and 
providing evidence in support of moderates’ claims that the state’s security needs can be met 
without nuclear arms, well-timed negative assurances might tilt the balance in domestic debates 
in favor of nonproliferation. 
To give an example, if there is any kind of internal debate in North Korea, this strategy 
suggests the best response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests would be to visibly increase 
                                                 





U.S. military cooperation with South Korea and Japan. But if hard-liners have absolute control or 
top leaders all share an enemy image of the United States, then this strategy less likely to work 
and might even backfire. It would be interpreted as further evidence of U.S. nefariousness and 
would reinforce the fears for regime survival of North Korea’s rulers. Hence, it is important to 
investigate whether or not there is sufficient scope for internal debate in a target country before 
trying to influence such debate. 
 
Hypothesis 13: Assurances will be more effective if they are packaged with positive incentives. 
 
This hypothesis follows from Solingen’s coalitional analysis and the previous hypothesis. If 
there is a political competition between outward-looking and inward-looking coalitions in the 
target state, then the goal of an influence strategy should be to strengthen the outward-looking 
coalition. If Solingen is right, the central issue in the domestic debate will be different views of 
participation in the global economy, and not the nuclear weapons program per se. It will hence 
be important to validate the arguments of the outward-looking coalition that openness to the 
outside world will lead to economic benefits and opportunities. Offers to open markets, provide 
foreign investment funds, or support membership in multilateral economic institutions would all 
be valuable incentives to proceed down the path favored by outward-looking forces. Threats to 
impose economic sanctions would also motivate a liberalizing coalition to turn away from 
nuclear weapons development, but such threats could also strengthen the inward-looking 
coalition. Sanctions would simply validate their claims that the outside world is hostile and 




that new sanctions would undermine outward-looking forces and strengthen inward-looking 
coalitions, it will be better to use positive incentives in combination with security assurances.  
 This hypothesis has obvious similarities to hypothesis 8 above. Taken together, they 
suggest that an important determinant of the effectiveness of NPT-related security assurances 
may be whether they are integrated appropriately into a larger strategy. The combination of 
NPT-related assurances, diplomatic efforts at reassurance, and economic engagement may be 
more potent than any one strategy on its own. 
 
Outline of the Volume 
 The first two chapters in this volume deal with the theory of security assurances. This 
introductory chapter has derived from relevant existing bodies of research more than a dozen 
potential hypotheses about the conditions that might affect the effectiveness of assurances. The 
next chapter, by Janice Stein, updates previous work she has done on the strategy of reassurance. 
It summarizes recent research on human psychology, especially concerning the role of emotions, 
to provide new insights about the value of reassurance and the psychological factors that 
influence whether or not it works. 
 The next two chapters provide a history and preliminary empirical assessment of NPT-
related assurances. John Simpson traces the evolving role of both positive and negative 
assurances in the nonproliferation regime and ongoing debates about how to strengthen such 
assurances. Bruno Tertrais then updates earlier empirical research he conducted on the efficacy 
of assurances, exploring in greater detail his previous conclusion that positive security 
assurances, especially in the form of bilateral defense pacts, have been the most effective type of 




 Following the reviews of theory and history, there are case studies that evaluate the 
impact of assurances on eight specific countries. The case-study authors were each provided in 
advance with a standardized list of questions to investigate in their case. These questions asked 
them to explore the extent to which security assurances were offered and with what effect, as 
well as whether other assurance measures might have been helpful but were not attempted. The 
case-study authors also had a draft list of the hypotheses from this introductory chapter for their 
consideration. 
 The cases were selected to include both apparent nonproliferation successes and failures 
as well as cases where both positive and negative assurances were more relevant. The emphasis 
was on the regions of greatest contemporary proliferation concern – the Middle East and East 
Asia – supplemented by some cases in which assurances have long been assumed to have played 
an important role. The Middle East section contains chapters by Wyn Bowen on Libya, James 
Walsh on Iran, and Michael Kraig on the Gulf Arab states. For Libya and Iran, negative 
assurances have been more relevant, with the difference that Libya appears to be a 
nonproliferation success story while Iran does not. For the Gulf states, positive assurances may 
become increasingly urgent as Iran moves toward a nuclear weapon capability. The Northeast 
Asia section also contains three cases: Yuki Tatsumi on Japan, Scott Snyder and Joyce Lee on 
South Korea, and John Park on North Korea. Japan and South Korea represent cases where 
positive assurances have been more relevant and apparently successful. For North Korea, like 
Iran, negative assurances have emerged as most relevant but to date without apparent success. 
The final empirical section includes a study of Sweden by Thomas Jonter and of Ukraine by 




convince both countries to renounce nuclear weapons, and the chapters here explore whether 
these assumptions are well founded. 
 The volume ends with a concluding chapter by James Wirtz that summarizes the case 
findings and the policy lessons they hold. As this project neared conclusion, it became clear that 
the case selection was likely to lead to clearer conclusions concerning positive assurances than 
negative assurances. There are more cases in which positive assurances were more relevant, and 
the negative assurance cases may overweight the rate of failure given that two of the three cases 
(Iran and North Korea) have been among the most challenging cases for finding any effective 
policy tool. Future research on countries from relatively non-aligned regions, such as South 
America or sub-Saharan Africa, would provide a more fully representative sample from which to 
evaluate negative security assurances. Still, the cases in this volume make it possible to offer 
some preliminary assessments. 
 
Conclusions 
 Security assurances are an integral component of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. But 
a strategy of seeking to assure other states about their security could be much more widely 
applicable in international politics. In contrast to the sizable literatures on other tools for 
influencing state behavior, such as deterrence and economic sanctions, there is little empirical 
research on the effectiveness of security assurances. This project aims to advance the state of 
knowledge on this question. Because assurances are unlikely to be uniformly effective in all 
cases, this introductory chapter has suggested a need to develop conditional generalizations 




 This chapter has canvassed relevant literatures to identify initial hypotheses that might 
apply to the nonproliferation realm. The most basic observation is that assurances are most likely 
to be effective when a target state’s potential interest in nuclear weapons is at least partly driven 
by security concerns. But the mere fact that a target state has security concerns does not 
guarantee that assurances will be effective. As with any influence strategy, an offer of assurances 
must be seen as credible by the recipient. This chapter has identified several factors that may 
affect the credibility of assurances. 
While general assurance postures that apply universally provide an important foundation 
for assurances, it may also be necessary to take account of the particular circumstances and 
concerns of individual target countries and tailor assurances accordingly. Other factors worth 
considering include internal debates in target countries as well as the influence of cognitive and 
emotional processes on individual decision-making. To deal with such factors, it may be helpful 
not to let NPT-related assurances stand on their own. NPT assurances may be more effective 
when packaged with other, related strategies. Finally, it is also important to remember that 
possible domestic and alliance constraints on sending states may also affect the chances that 
assurances will be effective. 
Although both positive and negative assurances are likely to be important, there can 
unfortunately be trade-offs between the two. Research on proliferation and actual U.S. policy 
have both tended to give the primary emphasis to positive assurances, but some of the 
hypotheses identified here suggest that in some situations negative assurances may turn out to be 
the more valuable nonproliferation tool. If so, it will be important to look for ways to gain the 
benefits of positive assurances without undermining negative assurances. One way to do this 




nuclear umbrella. If offers to respond to nuclear threats or attacks with conventional military 
campaigns, the provision of theater missile defenses, and various non-military forms of 
assistance would create sufficient positive assurance, some of the tensions between positive and 
negative assurances could be avoided. With almost no empirical knowledge base to draw on, all 
these suggestions are necessarily speculative. The most important goal of this project, therefore, 
is simply to expand our empirical understanding of how security assurances have worked as a 
nonproliferation tool in the past. 
